iA


Literatur 2017

Literaturempfehlungen für die Summer School von Feldman und Conee:

  • “Evidentialism”, Philosophical Studies 48 (1985): 15-34. Reprinted , with an appendix, in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2004.
  • “Evidence”, in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, Oxford, 2008, pp. 83-104.
  • “Responses”, in Evidentialism and Its Discontents, edited by Trent Dougherty, Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • (Feldman) “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence,” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz, Oxford, 2014.
  • (Conee) “Peerage,” Episteme (3) 313-323 (2009).
  • “Making Sense of Skepticism,” in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.
  • (Conee) “Extraordinary Skepticism” manuscript (Passwortgeschützt öffnen)
  • (Feldman) “Clifford’s Principle and James’s Options,” Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy 20 (2006).

Von anderen Autoren:

  • Juan Comesana,  “Evidentialist Reliabilism” Noûs 44:4 (2010), 571-600.
  • Karen L. Freedman, “Quasi-evidentialism: Interests, Justification, and Epistemic Virtue” Episteme 14 (2017): 147-160.
  • Roger White, “Evidence Cannot Be Permissive” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd Edition edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
  • Thomas Kelly, “Evidence Can Be Permissive”,  Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd Edition.
  • Veli Mitova, “Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist”, Philosophical Papers Vol. 37, No. 3 (November 2008): 471-489